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We argue that a transaction tax is likely to amplify, not dampen, volatility in the 
foreign exchange markets. Our argument stems from the decentralised trading 
practice and the presumable discrepancy between ‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ 
traders’ valuations. Since informed traders’ valuations are likely to be less 
dispersed, a transaction tax penalises informed trades disproportionately, leading 
to increased volatility. Empirical support for this prediction is found by 
investigating the effect of transaction costs on the volatility of DEM/USD and 
JPY/USD returns. High-frequency data are used and an increase in transaction 
costs is found to have a significant positive effect on volatility. 
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Transaktioveron vaikutuksesta valuuttakurssien 
vakauteen 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
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Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on osoittaa, että Tobinin veron kaltaisella trans-
aktioverolla olisi todennäköisesti valuuttakurssien vaihtelua lisäävä eikä vaimen-
tava vaikutus. Argumentti perustuu seuraaviin olettamuksiin: 1)  merkittävä osa 
valuuttamarkkinoiden transaktioista toteutetaan hajautetusti ja 2)  markkinoilla 
toimivien informoitujen ja ei-informoitujen toimijoiden valuutoille asettamat 
arvostukset määräytyvät eri jakaumista. Koska on syytä olettaa, että informoitujen 
toimijoiden arvostuksissa on vähemmän hajontaa, transaktiovero heikentää 
suhteellisesti enemmän informoitujen toimijoiden kaupankäyntimahdollisuuksia. 
Tällöin ei-informoitujen transaktioiden osuus markkinoilla kasvaa ja vaihto-
kurssien heilahtelu lisääntyy. Tutkimuksessa testataan hypoteesia tutkimalla 
transaktiokustannusten vaikutuksia Saksan markan ja Yhdysvaltain dollarin 
välisten ja Japanin jenin ja Yhdysvaltain dollarin välisten vaihtokurssien 
vaihteluun päivittäisellä ja päivänsisäisellä havaintoaineistolla. Osoittautuu, että 
transaktiokustannukset lisäävät merkitsevästi vaihtokurssien vaihtelua. 
 
Avainsanat: transaktiovero, valuuttakurssit, vaihtokurssien vakaus 
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There is an ongoing debate about whether transaction costs would increase
or decrease the volatility in ﬁnancial markets. Especially since Tobin’s (1978)
suggestion of a tax on all foreign exchange transactions intended to dampen
alleged excess volatility, a number of studies have been published on this
issue. The intuitive argument in favor of a general transactions tax is based
on the idea that there are ‘noise’ traders whose trading is not based on
information about security values, and hence, their trades may move prices
away from securities’ intrinsic values, increasing price volatility. The problem
with any indiscriminate transaction tax is, however, that it penalizes not
only destabilizing speculative trades but also trades which help to anchor the
market by providing liquidity and information. Therefore, as pointed out by
several authors (eg Kupiec (1996), Song and Zhang (2005)), the net eﬀect of
a transaction tax on price volatility will depend on the change of the trader
composition arising from the implementation of the tax. In addition to that,
a transaction tax may increase volatility by reducing market liquidity and
increasing the price impact of individual trades (eg Heaton and Lo (1995)).
There seems to be surprisingly little rigorous theoretical and empirical
research on the eﬀects of a transaction tax on volatility, and the existing
studies predominantly concentrate on the stock market. As such, all the
results obtained in this setup do not necessarily carry over to the foreign
exchange market, where trading is still distinctively decentralized. The most
noteworthy theoretical studies, ie Kupiec (1996) and Song and Zhang (2005),
provide mixed results that can be used to rationalize both the conventional
‘Tobinian’ wisdom as well as the contrarian view. In this article, we argue
that, when implemented in the foreign exchange market, a transaction tax
is likely to reduce ‘informed’ trades more than it discourages ‘uninformed’
agents from trading. As a result, volatility is likely to increase due to an
adverse trader composition eﬀect. The empirical evidence presented in the
paper lends support to this unambiguous relationship.
Our theoretical argument stems from the decentralized trading practice
and the presumable discrepancy between ‘informed’ and ‘uninformed’ traders’
valuations of the asset. In the foreign exchange markets ‘uninformed traders’
or ‘noise traders’ can be viewed as agents who constitute the basic demand
and supply in the market. A noise trader prone to sell (buy) has some
‘idiosyncratic’ reasons to have low (high) valuation for the asset. Among
the uninformed traders are importers and exporters in need of a speciﬁc
currency for their goods transactions. They can, to some extent, be assumed
to be unconcerned about whether the currency they demand is fundamentally
undervalued or overvalued. On the other hand, ‘informed traders’ can act
either as buyers or sellers, depending on their opinion about the intrinsic value
of the security and — given the uncoordinated and decentralized trading pattern
— whether they contact a trading partner who has lower or higher valuation
for the asset. Eﬀectively the introduction of a transaction tax means an equal
increase in transaction costs, and any transaction cost will obviously preclude
trade between agents whose valuations diﬀer less than the magnitude of this
cost. Since it seems justiﬁable to think that informed traders’ valuations are
7less dispersed than noise traders’ valuations, a transaction cost is likely to
hinder trade most among informed agents. Such an adverse trader composition
eﬀect will then increase volatility, because traders with extreme valuations
conclude transactions most frequently. Moreover, liquidity is reduced as
potentially gainful trades remain unrealized and the price impact of successful
trades is weighted.
In line with the existing theoretical literature, also most of the previous
empirical work on the eﬀect of transaction costs on ﬁnancial market volatility
concerns stock markets. The studies in this literature make use of time
series data around one-time regulatory or institutional changes such as the
introduction of or an increase in the transaction tax (Umlauf (1993), Jones and
Seguin (1997)), the introduction of decimal quotation (Bessembinder (2002))
or a tick size change (Hau (2003)). Unfortunately, the foreign exchange
market has not experienced similar abrupt institutional changes that could be
interpreted as natural experiments and that would allow for empirically testing
the implications of our theoretical model. Moreover, a potential problem with
the studies of this kind is the diﬃculty of controlling for other factors that
may simultaneously aﬀect fundamental volatility. Therefore, we follow Aliber,
Chowdhry and Yan (2003) in examining the eﬀects of transaction costs and
interpreting the results in terms of a transaction tax.
Using futures data, Aliber et al (2003) found a positive relationship between
transaction costs and volatility in the markets for the British Pound, Japanese
Yen and Swiss Franc (against the U.S. Dollar), in accordance with our
theoretical model. However, for the German Mark such a result could not be
established. Unfortunately, their empirical analysis suﬀers from two potential
shortcomings that may explain these somewhat contradictory ﬁndings. First
their monthly data are highly aggregated: both the transaction costs and
v o l a t i l i t yc a nv a r yc o n s i d e r a b l yw i t h i nam o n t ho re v e nad a y( s e eF i g u r e s1
and 2) which can obscure the results. To this end, we use daily and ﬁve-minute
data. Second, as pointed out by Werner (2003), it is possible that the positive
relationship between the conditional volatility and transaction cost results
from changes in fundamental volatility causing changes in transaction costs.
To solve this endogeneity problem an independent measure of fundamental
volatility is needed, and we argue that the news count variable included in our
data set can better be seen as such a variable than the spot market volatility
suggested by Aliber et al (2003). The empirical results with data on the
German Mark and Japanese Yen (against the U.S. Dollar) lend support to our
theoretical model: following an increase in transaction costs, price dispersion
increases, even controlling for fundamental volatility.
T h ep l a no ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s . S e c t i o n2f o r m a l i z e so u rt h e o r e t i c a l
argument. The data to be used in the empirical analysis is described in Section
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Figure 1: Daily transaction cost (left scale) and realized variance (right scale)
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Figure 2: Daily transaction cost (left scale) and realized variance (right scale)
for the Yen/$ exchange rate.
92 Transaction tax and volatility in the foreign
exchange markets: a theoretical perspective
Unlike most other ﬁnancial markets, the foreign exchange market is still
dominated by direct trades between banks acting on behalf of their clients
and themselves. According to the Bank for International Settlements (1999),
only approximately 25—36% of the transactions (depending on the country)
took place through electronic order-matching systems (eg Electronic Broking
Services (EBS) and Reuters Dealing 2000) in 1998, whereas most of the trade
occurred over the telephone based on bid and ask oﬀers conveyed to market
participants on the screens of companies such as Reuters, Bloomberg and
Bridge. While the share of electronic trading has increased over the recent
years, the market is still highly decentralized and can be modeled as a random
matching system. Moreover, the empirical evidence in the previous literature
as well as in this paper almost solely concentrates on the direct market due to
lack of available data on the electronic order-matching systems.
To derive the consequences of transaction costs on price dispersion, we
consider the following simple setup that captures the main features of the
market. Assume a continuum of traders who diﬀer in their ‘idiosyncratic’
valuation for the security. The ‘type’ (ie the valuation) of a trader is a
realization from the set Θ = {i1,i 2,n 1,n 2,}.T h et y p e si1 and i2 are informed
traders whose valuations are based on their estimate about the ‘intrinsic value’
of the security. The intrinsic value is normalized to unity. The informed trader
i1 (i2) has a pessimist (an optimist) opinion about the intrinsic value and his
valuation is 1 − ε (1+ε). The parameter ε captures the diﬀerence of opinion
between traders i1 and i2. The symmetry of the opinions around the intrinsic
value can be assumed without loss of generality because the correctness of the
estimate does not play any role in the analysis.1 The types n1 and n2,i nt u r n ,
are noise traders with more extreme valuations 1 − x and 1+x respectively.
We assume ε<x / 3 which guarantees that the trader n1 (n2)a l w a y sa c t sa sa
seller (buyer) in the market and the diﬀerence of valuations between traders is
the lowest when the types i1 and i2 are matched to trade. For simplicity, we
assume that traders are uniformly distributed over the set Θ which means that
each trader type is equally common in the market.2 Moreover, since traders
meet randomly, each feasible trading opportunity is equally probable in the
market.
Assume ﬁrst that there are no transaction costs. Upon a meeting, the
transaction is concluded at a price that splits the rent (the diﬀerence of
valuations) evenly among the traders. This practice corresponds to the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution. If alike traders meet, there will be no
rent to be shared and traders separate without completing the transaction.
1The symmetry of the informed valuations also captures the plausible idea that the true
intrinsic value can be computed as the weighted average of diﬀerent opinions; ie the pieces
of information dispersed in the market aggregates to perfect information.
2This assumption can be made without loss of generality because the ex ante composition
of traders does not aﬀect the qualitative results.
10Table 1 summarizes the prices at which trade is conducted in each feasible
trading opportunity.
Table 1: Prices at feasible trading opportunities.
n1 i1 i2 n2
n1 - 1 − x+ε
2 1 − x−ε
2 1






















which, due to the symmetry of valuations, equals with the intrinsic value of





Assume now that there is a transaction cost C levied on each successful
transaction and that this burden is evenly distributed between the traders.
The cost C can be interpreted to represent the eﬀects of a transaction tax.
Moreover, assume 2ε<C≤ x − ε, so that trade is no longer gainful
between the informed agents i1 and i2 but is still feasible between the noise
traders and between a noise trader and an informed trader. Hence, the
trading opportunities between i1 and i2 at price p =1are omitted and other
realizations are weighted in the price distribution. The expected price is still
E[p p C]=1but the variance yields




Thus, as the transaction cost limits the trading opportunities between informed
traders, the relative frequency of trades involving at least one noise trader is
increased, which then leads to greater price dispersion, too.
In the above analysis we compared, for simplicity, the situations with and
without a transaction cost. The fact that in practice there is virtually always
a nonzero transaction cost does not change the qualitative conclusions. It is
obvious that they generalize to the increase in the existing transaction costs.
113 Measuring volatility and transaction costs in the
foreign exchange market
In this section we describe the construction of the data to be used in the
empirical analysis. As a starting point we have the high-frequency data
set HFDF93 compiled by Olsen and Associates, consisting of the Deutsche
Mark—Dollar (DM/$) and Yen—Dollar (Yen/$) exchange rate quotations from
October 1, 1992 until September 30, 1993. These data have been examined
before by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a, b), inter alia. Although the sample
period is relatively short, its length is comparable to previous empirical studies
employing high-frequency ﬁnancial data. As the markets are highly liquid, the
amount of high-quality data is still more than suﬃcient for serious statistical
analysis. Furthermore, one advantage of this particular data set is that it
includes the ﬂow of money-market headline news on the Reuters AAMM screen
that can be used to extract the fundamental market volatility to be used as a
c o n t r o lv a r i a b l ea sd i s c u s s e db e l o w .
Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998b), we compute a measure of the
daily realized variance by summing squared ﬁve-minute returns over each
trading day. The use of ﬁve-minute returns is a compromise between the
theoretical considerations recommending sampling at very high frequencies and
the desire to avoid contamination by microstructure eﬀects (see eg Andersen et
al, 2001). The returns are computed as percentage diﬀerences of the averages
of the logarithmic bid and ask prices closest to the end of each ﬁve-minute
interval. Because of the very small trading activity over the weekends, returns
from Friday 21:00 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) through Sunday 21:00 GMT
were excluded, yielding a total of 260 observations of daily realized variance
for each exchange rate series. For details of the data set and construction of
the series, see Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a).
The measure of the transaction cost is based on the same ﬁve-minute bid
and ask quotes as the realized variance. Speciﬁcally, the daily averages of the





where Sb and Sa denote the bid and ask prices, respectively. The rationale
behind this measure can be seen by letting S denote the price of one unit
of currency if the customer faces no transaction costs and noticing that the









Solving for C now yields (3.1). In what follows, the percentage measure 100C
will be used.
12The daily transaction cost measures and the realized variance of DM/$ and
Yen/$ rates are depicted in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Visual inspection
suggests positive correlation between variance and transaction costs. There are
also some clearly exceptional periods. The DM/$ returns were very volatile at
the beginning of the sample period, presumably due to the heavy speculation
in the market involving several European currencies in September 1992 (see eg
Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998a). In the transaction cost series, two periods are
conspicuous; the highest spike corresponds to Christmas and the second highest
to Easter. The market was very thin around these days and the measure of
transaction costs is bound to be inaccurate. In the empirical analysis, we use
dummy variables to take these as well as some other holidays into account.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Daily regressions
To study the relationship between the volatility and transaction costs of
exchange rate returns and to test the implication of a positive volatility eﬀect of
an increase in transaction costs, realized variance was regressed on transaction
costs and some control variables.3 Because the realized variance turned out
to be autocorrelated in both cases, its ﬁrst lag was included in the models.
In addition, dummy variables were introduced to take calendar eﬀects into
account. First, a Friday dummy was included in all model speciﬁcations
because speciﬁce v e n t si nt h es a m p l ep e r i o do f t e nh a p p e n e dt oo c c u ro n
Fridays, as pointed out by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a). Second, there
was very little trading around certain national and international holidays, and
hence, a dummy variable for these holidays was constructed. This dummy
equals unity on the days listed in the appendix to Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998a) and zero otherwise. Finally, we also experimented with separate
dummies for the most exceptional periods (Christmas and Easter), but they
turned out to be insigniﬁcant at conventional levels, and despite their inclusion,
the parameter estimates remained more or less intact. Thus, the results of
these model speciﬁcations are not reported.
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 2. For both
the DM/$ and Yen/$ returns the results of two diﬀerent speciﬁcations are
presented to examine the robustness of the results with respect to the holiday
dummy. The parameters are, in general, very accurately estimated. However,
the holiday dummy is not signiﬁcant even at the 10% level in the DM/$
r e t u r nm o d e l ,a n dt h u sw ep r e f e rs p e c i ﬁcation (2). For the Yen/$ return
equation, in contrast, the holiday dummy is highly signiﬁcant and speciﬁcation
(1) is preferred. In both of these model speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients of the
transaction cost variable are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Also the
lagged realized variance is signiﬁcant in each case. According to the diagnostic
tests, error autocorrelation or autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity are
3We also estimated speciﬁcations with the realized standard deviation as the regressand,
but according to diagnostic tests these models were not satisfactory.
13Table 2: OLS regressions of realized variance on transactions costs and control
variables.
DM/$ Variance Yen/$ Variance
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept —0.413 —0.341 —1.412 —1.312
(—1.548) (—1.286) (—3.463) (—3.106)
Transaction Cost 27.506 24.197 51.898 47.825
(2.564) (2.294) (4.213) (3.756)
Lagged Variance 0.499 0.514 0.351 0.388
(7.726) (8.179) (4.937) (5.259)
Friday —0.187 —0.184 —0.218 —0.209
(—4.397) (—4.344) (—4.050) (—3.910)
Holiday —0.065 —0.169
(—1.137) (—2.689)
R2 0.480 0.477 0.431 0.417
log likelihood —29.294 —30.029 —107.394 —110.402
AR(5)a 0.076 0.156 0.336 0.214
ARCH(1)b 0.108 0.101 0.553 0.540
Heteroskedasticityc <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
RESET test 0.097 0.183 0.179 0.592
The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-values based on White’s (1980) robust
standard errors. For the diagnostic tests marginal signiﬁcance levels are
reported
aLM test for ﬁfth-order error autocorrelation
bLM test for ﬁrst-order autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.
cWhite’s (1980) test for error heteroskedasticity.
not a problem and the RESET test does not provide strong evidence against
any of the speciﬁcations. Errors seem to be heteroskedastic, and therefore,
t-statistics based on White’s (1980) robust standard errors are reported.4
In view of the t-statistics in Table 2, there indeed seems to be a positive
relationship between transaction costs and volatility for both currencies
contrary to the ﬁndings of Aliber et al (2003). Thus, the results lend support
to our theoretical model in Section 2. In order to get an idea of the economic
signiﬁcance of this relationship it is interesting to compute the eﬀect of, say,
a 0.01% increase in the transaction costs on variance. To this end, we use
the estimates of speciﬁcation (2) for the DM/$ returns and speciﬁcation (1)
for the Yen/$ returns. In the former case, taking the eﬀect of the lagged
variance into account, the eﬀect of a 0.01% change in the transaction cost
equals 0.01% · 24.197/(1 − 0.514) = 0.00498. T h i si sa b o u t1 . 1 6 %o ft h e
4Because it is likely that the error terms of the equations for the DM/$ and Yen/$ returns
are correlated, eﬃciency gains could be obtained by estimating the model as a bivariate
system. The diﬀerences between such GMM estimates and the OLS estimates presented in
Table 2 turned out to be minor albeit with somewhat smaller standard errors. Therefore,
t h e s er e s u l t sa r en o tr e p o r t e d .
14average variance of the DM/$ returns in the sample (0.427). For the Yen/$
returns the corresponding ﬁgure is 1.21%. Both ﬁgures indicate that the eﬀect
of even a small increase in transaction costs, or equivalently the introduction
of an equal tax, would, on average, increase the volatility of the exchange rate
returns considerably. For the Yen/$ returns this is considerably higher than
the approximately 0.25% that Aliber et al (2003) obtained. Furthermore, our
estimates for the Yen/$ and DM/$ returns are very close to each other, whereas
their estimate for the DM/$ return is clearly smaller and not even statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
It is, of course, possible that the positive relationship between the
conditional volatility and transaction cost results from changes in fundamental
volatility causing changes in transaction costs. One way to control this eﬀect is
to include an independent measure of fundamental volatility as an explanatory
variable in the regression model. Recently, Eddelbüttel and McCurdy (1998)
have demonstrated, using this same data set, that the frequency of news is
strongly associated with volatility, ie, exchange rates are more volatile during
periods with a lot of economic news. Following Eddelbüttel and McCurdy
(1998), we thus use the total number of money-market headlines on the Reuters
AAMM screen each day. According to the results (not shown), the news
count variable is positive and clearly signiﬁcant (p-values less than 0.0001)
for both exchange rates. The other coeﬃcients and their t-statistics are
not much aﬀected; the estimated coeﬃcients of the transaction cost variable
increase somewhat. Hence, the conclusions drawn above are supported and
the causality indeed seems to run from the transaction costs to conditional
volatility.
4.2 Intradaily regressions
Above we have evidence that increases in transaction costs tend to increase
daily conditional volatility. The daily data are, however, still quite aggregated
in that transaction costs can vary over each day, and, therefore, it might
be interesting to check whether this relationship also holds at the intradaily
level. Even though the dataset contains all the quotes, building an operational
model beyond the daily frequency is in practice complicated. As discussed by
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a), inter alia, especially intradaily seasonalities
and market microstructure eﬀects have to be taken into account. To this end,
we employ the Flexible Fourier form (FFF) regression originally introduced
by Gallant (1981, 1982) and applied to exchange rate returns by Andersen
and Bollerslev (1997). The model is estimated using ﬁve-minute returns to
mitigate microstructure eﬀects.5
5In particular, as Daníelsson and Payne (2002) have recently pointed out, the bid and ask
quotes such as ours, obtained from the interbank Reuters network are indicative rather than
ﬁrm in that they are not binding commitments to trade. Hence, at very high frequencies
they may not accurately measure tradeable exchange rates. Daníelsson and Payne (2002),
however, show that at levels of aggregation of ﬁve minutes and above, returns computed
from these data are a fairly good proxy for ﬁrm returns.
15The FFF regression equation takes the form6
2log























+β1Costt,n + β2Fridayt + β3Holidayt + εt,n (4.1)
where Rt,n denotes the return in interval n on day t, R t h es a m p l em e a no f
the ﬁve-minute returns and b σt an estimate of the daily volatility factor. N
is the number of return intervals in a day (N =288) and N1 =( N +1 ) /2
and N2 =( N +1 ) ( N +2 ) /6. The trigonometric functions are supposed to
capture the smooth intradaily seasonal patterns in volatility. The dummies
Friday and Holiday are deﬁned as in the daily regressions above, and Cost
is computed using formula (3.1) with the bid and ask prices closest to the
beginning of each ﬁve-minute interval. Here we are mostly interested in the
eﬀect of the transaction costs on volatility (ie the coeﬃcient β1), while the
periodic variation in volatility is considered as a nuisance. However, as the
results in Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) suggest, ignoring these periodicities
could yield misleading conclusions. In practice equation (4.1) is estimated in
two steps. First, a GARCH(1,1) model is estimated for daily exchange rate
returns to obtain the daily volatility factor b σt.T h e n t h i s b σt is plugged into
equation (4.1) which is estimated by ordinary least squares. Note that here
we are only modeling the periodic component of volatility, so the magnitude
of the estimated coeﬃcients cannot be directly used to compute the eﬀect of
the transaction cost on volatility. However, if β1 turns out to be signiﬁcantly
positive, it indicates that an increase in transaction costs gives rise to increased
volatility.
We estimated model (4.1) using the 74880 ﬁve-minute returns of both
exchange rates. As expected, the ﬁrst-step GARCH(1,1) models estimated
using daily data from the beginning of October 1987 through September 29,
1993 (not reported) indicated high persistence in conditional variance. The
results for the Fourier Flexible form regressions are presented in Table 3. The
error term is highly autocorrelated, and following Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998a), Newey—West (1987) standard errors with 289 lags are used to compute
the t-statistics. The choice of P =4turned out to be suﬃcient, and all the
coeﬃcients are very accurately estimated. In particular, the estimate of β1,
the coeﬃcient of the transaction cost variable, is positive and signiﬁcant at
any reasonable signiﬁcance level for both currencies. Thus these results lend
support to the conclusion drawn from daily regressions that an increase in
6This is based on the following decomposition for the intraday returns:
Rt,n = E (Rt,n)+
σt,nst,nzt,n √
N
where σt,n is the daily volatility factor, st,n the periodic volatility component for the nth
intraday interval, zt,n an iid(0,1) innovation and N the number of return intervals in a day.
For details, see Andersen and Bollerslev (1997).
16Table 3: Results for the Flexible Fourier form regressions.
DM/$ Returns Yen/$ Returns
µ 1.584 (2.512) -3.166 (-4.375)
δ0,1 -9.152 (-5.013) -7.838 (-3.804)
δ0,2 3.076 (5.035) 2.635 (3.821)
δc,1 -2.155 (-5.842) -1.778 (-4.276)
δs,1 -0.836 (-13.601) -0.437 (-6.377)
δc,2 -0.513 (-5.493) -0.483 (-4.533)
δs,2 0.077 (1.969) 0.106 (2.673)
δc,3 -0.537 (-11.195) -0.518 (-9.630)
δs,3 0.467 (15.424) 0.413 (12.589)
δc,4 -0.169 (-4.874) -0.243 (-6.271)
δs,4 -0.330 (-11.934) -0.345 (-12.080)
β1 17.064 (3.994) 129.715 (5.954)
β2 -0.266 (-2.213) -0.330 (-2.847)
β3 -0.423 (-1.991) -1.052 (-3.442)
The ﬁgures in parentheses are t-values based on
Newey and West’s (1987) robust standard
errors incorporating 289 lags
transaction costs indeed seems to lead to higher volatility in accordance with
our theoretical model.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model explaining the eﬀect of an
increase in transaction costs on price volatility in the foreign exchange market.
As a starting point we have the decentralized structure of this market. In
the model the market consists of uninformed and informed traders with
the former group including importers and exporters in need of a speciﬁc
currency. Many of the uninformed traders can thus be assumed to be relatively
unconcerned about the ‘intrinsic value’ of the currency they demand. The
‘informed’ traders’ participation, in turn, is motivated by their opinion about
whether the currency is fundamentally undervalued or overvalued. We show in
a simple decentralized trading model that a transaction tax will have a positive
eﬀect on volatility if the informed traders’ opinions are less dispersed than the
noise traders’ valuation. This is because the tax (eﬀectively meaning higher
transaction costs) hinders ‘informed’ trades disproportionately, giving rise to
an adverse trader composition eﬀect.
In support of the theoretical model, we also provide empirical evidence
that increases in transaction costs (which proxy the presumable eﬀect of a
transaction tax) lead to increased volatility in the foreign exchange market.
This relationship seems to be both statistically and economically signiﬁcant at
the daily level, and intradaily regressions reinforce this conclusion, suggesting
17that it does not result from aggregation eﬀects. The results are in line with
the implications our theoretical model but go somewhat contrary to the recent
results of Aliber et al (2003) who, using highly aggregated monthly data, did
not uncover a positive relationship between transaction costs and volatility
in DM/Dollar market. For the Yen/Dollar market they did ﬁnd such a
relationship although our calculations seem to indicate a somewhat stronger
eﬀect. In addition to the level of aggregation, another diﬀerence between their
study and ours is that we explicitly take into account the eﬀect of changes
in the fundamental volatility, thus controlling for the potential endogeneity
problem. These ﬁndings are bad news to proponents of the Tobin tax whose
main argument has been that a transaction tax on foreign exchange would
decrease volatility.
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